=pod =head1 NAME RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt - RSA public key cryptography =head1 SYNOPSIS #include <openssl/rsa.h> int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); =head1 DESCRIPTION RSA_public_encrypt() encrypts the B<flen> bytes at B<from> (usually a session key) using the public key B<rsa> and stores the ciphertext in B<to>. B<to> must point to RSA_size(B<rsa>) bytes of memory. B<padding> denotes one of the following modes: =over 4 =item RSA_PKCS1_PADDING PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. This currently is the most widely used mode. =item RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING EME-OAEP as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 with SHA-1, MGF1 and an empty encoding parameter. This mode is recommended for all new applications. =item RSA_SSLV23_PADDING PKCS #1 v1.5 padding with an SSL-specific modification that denotes that the server is SSL3 capable. =item RSA_NO_PADDING Raw RSA encryption. This mode should I<only> be used to implement cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code. Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure. =back B<flen> must be less than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes, less than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 41 for RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(B<rsa>) for RSA_NO_PADDING. The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling RSA_public_encrypt(). RSA_private_decrypt() decrypts the B<flen> bytes at B<from> using the private key B<rsa> and stores the plaintext in B<to>. B<to> must point to a memory section large enough to hold the decrypted data (which is smaller than RSA_size(B<rsa>)). B<padding> is the padding mode that was used to encrypt the data. =head1 RETURN VALUES RSA_public_encrypt() returns the size of the encrypted data (i.e., RSA_size(B<rsa>)). RSA_private_decrypt() returns the size of the recovered plaintext. On error, -1 is returned; the error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>. =head1 WARNING Decryption failures in the RSA_PKCS1_PADDING mode leak information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING. =head1 CONFORMING TO SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0 =head1 SEE ALSO L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<RAND_bytes(3)>, L<RSA_size(3)> =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. =cut |