#
# Security configuration
#
menu "Security options"
source security/keys/Kconfig
config [31mCONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT[0m
bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
default n
help
This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
syslog via dmesg(8).
If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config [31mCONFIG_SECURITY[0m
bool "Enable different security models"
depends on [31mCONFIG_SYSFS[0m
depends on [31mCONFIG_MULTIUSER[0m
help
This allows you to choose different security modules to be
configured into your kernel.
If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
model will be used.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config [31mCONFIG_SECURITYFS[0m
bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
help
This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
the TPM bios character driver and [31mCONFIG_IMA[0m, an integrity provider. It is
not used by SELinux or SMACK.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config [31mCONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK[0m
bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
depends on [31mCONFIG_SECURITY[0m
help
This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
implement socket and networking access controls.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config [31mCONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM[0m
bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
depends on [31mCONFIG_XFRM[0m && [31mCONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK[0m
help
This enables the [31mCONFIG_XFRM[0m (IPSec) networking security hooks.
If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
implement per-packet access controls based on labels
derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
IPSec.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config [31mCONFIG_SECURITY_PATH[0m
bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
depends on [31mCONFIG_SECURITY[0m
help
This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
implement pathname based access controls.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config [31mCONFIG_INTEL_TXT[0m
bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
depends on [31mCONFIG_HAVE_INTEL_TXT[0m
help
This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
will have no effect.
Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
of the kernel itself.
Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
about Intel(R) TXT.
See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
config [31mCONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR[0m
int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
depends on [31mCONFIG_SECURITY[0m && [31mCONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX[0m
default 32768 if [31mCONFIG_ARM[0m || ([31mCONFIG_ARM64[0m && [31mCONFIG_COMPAT[0m)
default 65536
help
This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
this low address space will need the permission specific to the
systems running [31mCONFIG_LSM[0m.
config [31mCONFIG_HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR[0m
bool
help
The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
config [31mCONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY[0m
bool
help
The architecture supports CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY by
calling check_object_size() just before performing the
userspace copies in the low level implementation of
copy_to_user() and copy_from_user().
config [31mCONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY[0m
bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
depends on [31mCONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY[0m
depends on [31mCONFIG_HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR[0m
select [31mCONFIG_BUG[0m
help
This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
separately allocates pages, are not on the process stack,
or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
config [31mCONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN[0m
bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages"
depends on [31mCONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY[0m
depends on [31mCONFIG_EXPERT[0m
help
When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP,
hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are,
however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all
been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
trying to find such users.
source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
source security/apparmor/Kconfig
source security/loadpin/Kconfig
source security/yama/Kconfig
source security/integrity/Kconfig
choice
prompt "Default security module"
default [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX[0m if [31mCONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX[0m
default [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK[0m if [31mCONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK[0m
default [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO[0m if [31mCONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO[0m
default [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR[0m if [31mCONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR[0m
default [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC[0m
help
Select the security module that will be used by default if the
kernel parameter security= is not specified.
config [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX[0m
bool "SELinux" if [31mCONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX[0m=y
config [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK[0m
bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if [31mCONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK[0m=y
config [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO[0m
bool "TOMOYO" if [31mCONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO[0m=y
config [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR[0m
bool "AppArmor" if [31mCONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR[0m=y
config [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC[0m
bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
endchoice
config [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY[0m
string
default "selinux" if [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX[0m
default "smack" if [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK[0m
default "tomoyo" if [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO[0m
default "apparmor" if [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR[0m
default "" if [31mCONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC[0m
endmenu