#------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# $File: pgp-binary-keys,v 1.2 2021/04/26 15:56:00 christos Exp $
# pgp-binary-keys: This file handles pgp binary keys.
#
# An PGP certificate or message doesn't have a fixed header. Instead,
# they are sequences of packets:
#
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-4.3
#
# whose order conforms to a grammar:
#
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-11
#
# Happily most packets have a few fields that are constrained, which
# allow us to fingerprint them with relatively high certainty.
#
# A PGP packet is described by a single byte: the so-called CTB. The
# high-bit is always set. If bit 6 is set, then it is a so-called
# new-style CTB; if bit 6 is clear, then it is a so-called old-style
# CTB. Old-style CTBs have only four bits of type information; bits
# 1-0 are used to describe the length. New-style CTBs have 6 bits of
# type information.
#
# Following the CTB is the packet's length in bytes. If we blindly
# advance the file cursor by this amount past the end of the length
# information we come to the next packet.
#
# Data Structures
# ===============
#
# New Style CTB
# -------------
#
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-4.2.2
#
# 76543210
# ||\----/
# || tag
# |always 1
# always 1
#
# Tag bits 7 and 6 set
# 0 0xC0 -- Reserved - a packet tag MUST NOT have this value
# 1 0xC1 -- Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet
# 2 0xC2 -- Signature Packet
# 3 0xC3 -- Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet
# 4 0xC4 -- One-Pass Signature Packet
# 5 0xC5 -- Secret-Key Packet
# 6 0xC6 -- Public-Key Packet
# 7 0xC7 -- Secret-Subkey Packet
# 8 0xC8 -- Compressed Data Packet
# 9 0xC9 -- Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet
# 10 0xCA -- Marker Packet
# 11 0xCB -- Literal Data Packet
# 12 0xCC -- Trust Packet
# 13 0xCD -- User ID Packet
# 14 0xCE -- Public-Subkey Packet
# 17 0xD1 -- User Attribute Packet
# 18 0xD2 -- Sym. Encrypted and Integrity Protected Data Packet
# 19 0xD3 -- Modification Detection Code Packet
# 60 to 63 -- Private or Experimental Values
#
# The CTB is followed by the length header, which is densely encoded:
#
# if length[0] is:
# 0..191: one byte length (length[0])
# 192..223: two byte length ((length[0] - 192) * 256 + length[2] + 192
# 224..254: four byte length (big endian interpretation of length[1..5])
# 255: partial body encoding
#
# The partial body encoding is similar to HTTP's chunk encoding. It
# is only allowed for container packets (SEIP, Compressed Data and
# Literal).
#
# Old Style CTB
# -------------
#
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-4.2.1
#
# CTB:
#
# 76543210
# ||\--/\/
# || | length encoding
# || tag
# |always 0
# always 1
#
# Tag:
#
# Tag bit 7 set, bits 6, 1, 0 clear
# 0 0x80 -- Reserved - a packet tag MUST NOT have this value
# 1 0x84 -- Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet
# 2 0x88 -- Signature Packet
# 3 0x8C -- Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet
# 4 0x90 -- One-Pass Signature Packet
# 5 0x94 -- Secret-Key Packet
# 6 0x98 -- Public-Key Packet
# 7 0x9C -- Secret-Subkey Packet
# 8 0xA0 -- Compressed Data Packet
# 9 0xA4 -- Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet
# 10 0xA8 -- Marker Packet
# 11 0xAC -- Literal Data Packet
# 12 0xB0 -- Trust Packet
# 13 0xB4 -- User ID Packet
# 14 0xB8 -- Public-Subkey Packet
#
# Length encoding:
#
# Value
# 0 1 byte length (following byte is the length)
# 1 2 byte length (following two bytes are the length)
# 2 4 byte length (following four bytes are the length)
# 3 indeterminate length: natural end of packet, e.g., EOF
#
# An indeterminate length is only allowed for container packets
# (SEIP, Compressed Data and Literal).
#
# Certificates
# ------------
#
# We check the first three packets to determine if a sequence of
# OpenPGP packets is likely to be a certificate. The grammar allows
# the following prefixes:
#
# [Primary Key] [SIG] (EOF or another certificate)
# [Primary Key] [SIG] [User ID] [SIG]...
# [Primary Key] [SIG] [User Attribute] [SIG]...
# [Primary Key] [SIG] [Subkey] [SIG]...
# [Primary Key] [User ID] [SIG]...
# [Primary Key] [User Attribute] [SIG]...
# [Primary Key] [Subkey] [SIG]...
#
# Any number of marker packets are also allowed between each packet,
# but they are not normally used and we don't currently check for
# them.
#
# The keys and subkeys may be public or private.
#
# Key packets and signature packets are versioned. There are two
# packet versions that we need to worry about in practice: v3 and v4.
# v4 packets were introduced in RFC 2440, which was published in 1998.
# It also deprecated v3 packets. There are no actively used v3
# certificates (GnuPG removed the code to support them in November
# 2014). But there are v3 keys lying around and it is useful to
# identify them. The next version of OpenPGP will introduce v5 keys.
# The document has not yet been standardized so changes are still
# possible. But, for our purposes, it appears that v5 data structures
# will be identical to v4 data structures modulo the version number.
#
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2440
# https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2014q4/000358.html
# https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc4880bis-09.html#name-key-material-packet
# The first packet has to be a public key or a secret key.
#
# New-Style Public Key
0 ubyte =0xC6 OpenPGP Public Key
>&0 use primary_key_length_new
# New-Style Secret Key
0 ubyte =0xC5 OpenPGP Secret Key
>&0 use primary_key_length_new
# Old-Style Public Key
0 ubyte&0xFC =0x98 OpenPGP Public Key
>&-1 use primary_key_length_old
# Old-Style Secret Key
0 ubyte&0xFC =0x94 OpenPGP Secret Key
>&-1 use primary_key_length_old
# Parse the length, check the packet's body and finally advance to the
# next packet.
# There are 4 different new-style length encodings, but the partial
# body encoding is only acceptable for the SEIP, Compressed Data, and
# Literal packets, which isn't valid for any packets in a certificate
# so we ignore it.
0 name primary_key_length_new
>&0 ubyte <192
#>>&0 ubyte x (1 byte length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&0 use pgp_binary_key_pk_check
>>>&(&-1.B) use sig_or_component_1
>&0 ubyte >191
>>&-1 ubyte <225
# offset = ((offset[0] - 192) << 8) + offset[1] + 192 (for the length header)
# raw - (192 * 256 - 192)
# = 48960
#>>>&0 ubeshort x (2 byte length encoding, %d bytes)
>>>&1 use pgp_binary_key_pk_check
>>>>&(&-2.S-48960) use sig_or_component_1
>&0 ubyte =255
#>>&0 belong x (5 byte length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&4 use pgp_binary_key_pk_check
>>>&(&-4.L) use sig_or_component_1
# Partial body encoding (only valid for container packets).
# >&0 ubyte >224
# >>&0 ubyte <255 partial body encoding
# There are 4 different old-style length encodings, but the
# indeterminate length encoding is only acceptable for the SEIP,
# Compressed Data, and Literal packets, which isn't valid for any
# packets in a certificate.
0 name primary_key_length_old
#>&0 ubyte x (ctb: %x)
>&0 ubyte&0x3 =0
#>>&0 ubyte x (1 byte length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&1 use pgp_binary_key_pk_check
>>>&(&-1.B) use sig_or_component_1
>&0 ubyte&0x3 =1
#>>&0 ubeshort x (2 byte length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&2 use pgp_binary_key_pk_check
>>>&(&-2.S) use sig_or_component_1
>&0 ubyte&0x3 =2
#>>&0 ubelong x (4 byte length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&4 use pgp_binary_key_pk_check
>>>&(&-4.L) use sig_or_component_1
# Check the Key.
#
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5.2
0 name pgp_binary_key_pk_check
# Valid versions are: 2, 3, 4. 5 is proposed in RFC 4880bis.
# Anticipate a v6 / v7 format that like v5 is compatible with v4.
# key format in a decade or so :D.
>&0 ubyte >1
>>&-1 ubyte <8
>>>&-1 byte x Version %d
# Check that keys were created after 1990.
# (1990 - 1970) * 365.2524 * 24 * 60 * 60 = 631156147
>>>&0 bedate >631156147 \b, Created %s
>>>>&-5 ubyte >3
>>>>>&4 use pgp_binary_key_algo
>>>>&-5 ubyte <4
>>>>>&6 use pgp_binary_key_algo
# Print out the key's algorithm and the number of bits, if this is
# relevant (ECC keys are a fixed size).
0 name pgp_binary_key_algo
>0 clear x
>&0 ubyte =1 \b, RSA (Encrypt or Sign,
>>&0 ubeshort x \b %d bits)
>&0 ubyte =2 \b, RSA (Encrypt,
>>&0 ubeshort x \b %d bits)
>&0 ubyte =3 \b, RSA (Sign,
>>&0 ubeshort x \b %d bits)
>&0 ubyte =16 \b, El Gamal (Encrypt,
>>&0 ubeshort x \b %d bits)
>&0 ubyte =17 \b, DSA
>>&0 ubeshort x \b (%d bits)
>&0 ubyte =18 \b, ECDH
>&0 ubyte =19 \b, ECDSA
>&0 ubyte =20 \b, El Gamal (Encrypt or Sign,
>>&0 ubeshort x \b %d bits)
>&0 ubyte =22 \b, EdDSA
>&0 default x
>>&0 ubyte x \b, Unknown Algorithm (%#x)
# Match all possible second packets.
0 name sig_or_component_1
#>0 ubyte x (ctb: %x)
>&0 ubyte =0xC2
>>0 ubyte x \b; Signature
>>&0 use sig_or_component_1_length_new
>&0 ubyte =0xCD
>>0 ubyte x \b; User ID
>>&0 use sig_or_component_1_length_new
>&0 ubyte =0xCE
>>0 ubyte x \b; Public Subkey
>>&0 use sig_or_component_1_length_new
>&0 ubyte =0xC7
>>0 ubyte x \b; Secret Subkey
>>&0 use sig_or_component_1_length_new
>&0 ubyte =0xD1
>>0 ubyte x \b; User Attribute
>>&0 use sig_or_component_1_length_new
>&0 ubyte&0xFC =0x88
>>0 ubyte x \b; Signature
>>&-1 use sig_or_component_1_length_old
>&0 ubyte&0xFC =0xB4
>>0 ubyte x \b; User ID
>>&-1 use sig_or_component_1_length_old
>&0 ubyte&0xFC =0xB8
>>0 ubyte x \b; Public Subkey
>>&-1 use sig_or_component_1_length_old
>&0 ubyte&0xFC =0x9C
>>0 ubyte x \b; Secret Subkey
>>&-1 use sig_or_component_1_length_old
# Copy of 'primary_key_length_new', but calls cert_packet_3.
0 name sig_or_component_1_length_new
>&0 ubyte <192
#>>&0 ubyte x (1 byte new length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&-1.B) use cert_packet_3
>&0 ubyte >191
>>&-1 ubyte <225
# offset = ((offset[0] - 192) << 8) + offset[1] + 192 + 1 (for the length header)
# raw - (192 * 256 - 192 - 1)
# = 48959
#>>>&-1 ubeshort x (2 byte new length encoding, %d bytes)
>>>&(&-1.S-48959) use cert_packet_3
>&0 ubyte =255
#>>&0 belong x (5 byte new length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&-4.L) use cert_packet_3
# Partial body encoding (only valid for container packets).
# >&0 ubyte >224
# >>&0 ubyte <255 partial body encoding
0 name sig_or_component_1_length_old
#>&0 ubyte x (ctb: %x)
>&0 ubyte&0x3 =0
#>>&0 ubyte x (1 byte old length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&0.B+1) use cert_packet_3
>&0 ubyte&0x3 =1
#>>&0 ubeshort x (2 byte old length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&0.S+2) use cert_packet_3
>&0 ubyte&0x3 =2
#>>&0 ubelong x (4 byte old length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&0.L+4) use cert_packet_3
# Copy of above.
0 name cert_packet_3
#>0 ubyte x (ctb: %x)
>&0 ubyte =0xC2
>>0 ubyte x \b; Signature
>>&0 use cert_packet_3_length_new
>&0 ubyte =0xCD
>>0 ubyte x \b; User ID
>>&0 use cert_packet_3_length_new
>&0 ubyte =0xCE
>>0 ubyte x \b; Public Subkey
>>&0 use cert_packet_3_length_new
>&0 ubyte =0xC7
>>0 ubyte x \b; Secret Subkey
>>&0 use cert_packet_3_length_new
>&0 ubyte =0xD1
>>0 ubyte x \b; User Attribute
>>&0 use cert_packet_3_length_new
>&0 ubyte&0xFC =0x88
>>0 ubyte x \b; Signature
>>&-1 use cert_packet_3_length_old
>&0 ubyte&0xFC =0xB4
>>0 ubyte x \b; User ID
>>&-1 use cert_packet_3_length_old
>&0 ubyte&0xFC =0xB8
>>0 ubyte x \b; Public Subkey
>>&-1 use cert_packet_3_length_old
>&0 ubyte&0xFC =0x9C
>>0 ubyte x \b; Secret Subkey
>>&-1 use cert_packet_3_length_old
# Copy of above.
0 name cert_packet_3_length_new
>&0 ubyte <192
#>>&0 ubyte x (1 byte new length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&-1.B) use pgp_binary_keys_end
>&0 ubyte >191
>>&-1 ubyte <225
# offset = ((offset[0] - 192) << 8) + offset[1] + 192 + 1 (for the length header)
# raw - (192 * 256 - 192 - 1)
# = 48959
#>>>&-1 ubeshort x (2 byte new length encoding, %d bytes)
>>>&(&-1.S-48959) use pgp_binary_keys_end
>&0 ubyte =255
#>>&0 belong x (5 byte new length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&-4.L) use pgp_binary_keys_end
0 name cert_packet_3_length_old
#>&0 ubyte x (ctb: %x)
>&0 ubyte&0x3 =0
#>>&0 ubyte x (1 byte old length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&0.B+1) use pgp_binary_keys_end
>&0 ubyte&0x3 =1
#>>&0 ubeshort x (2 byte old length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&0.S+2) use pgp_binary_keys_end
>&0 ubyte&0x3 =2
#>>&0 ubelong x (4 byte old length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&0.L+4) use pgp_binary_keys_end
# We managed to parse the first three packets of the certificate. Declare
# victory.
0 name pgp_binary_keys_end
>0 byte x \b; OpenPGP Certificate
!:mime application/pgp-keys
!:ext pgp/gpg/pkr/asd